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The Present Is Necessary! Rejoinder to Rota
William Hasker

My account of free will entails that events of the present moment are “necessary” in the same way that the past is necessary. I argue that Michael Rota’s
main objection to this account is unsuccessful. I also argue that Rota’s synchronous account of contingency is inferior to the diachronic account which
I favor.

Once again, I must thank Michael Rota for his close attention to my work.
In this second critique,1 he is working mainly with a brief, and somewhat
informal, statement of mine, and it is not unexpected that refinements are
needed as further complications are introduced. He does his best to make
the required modifications, and to a large extent he is successful in doing
so. In the end, we do part company. Here are some key statements of mine,
as quoted by Rota:
(FW) N is free at T with respect to performing A =df It is in N’s power at T to
perform A, and it is in N’s power at T to refrain from performing A.
(P2)

In general, if it is in N’s power at T to perform A, then there is nothing
in the circumstances that obtain at T which prevents or precludes N’s
performing A.

Also the following, drawing on a quotation from Suarez:
According to the philosophers [Suarez] cites, the will is not free in the sense
of (FW) at the very instant at which it is acting. However, these philosophers mention two other ways in which the will may very well be free at
that instant, namely, “the sense that (i) the act proceeds from the freedom
and indifference that the will had immediately before that instant or in the
sense that (ii) at the instant in question the will has the power to desist from
the act in the time immediately following that instant.” These two alternatives (or the combination of the two) specify, I want to say, what is properly
meant by saying that the act in question is a free act.

Now, a little consideration will reveal that the alternatives (i) and (ii) in
the quotation from Suarez actually pertain to slightly different acts on the
part of the agent. (i) is relevant to the act now being performed by the agent,
1
Michael Rota, “Freedom and the Necessity of the Present: A Reply to William Hasker,”
Faith and Philosophy 29:4 (this issue). See this reply for references to earlier stages in the
discussion.
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whereas (ii) is relevant to the continuation or non-continuation of that act in
the immediate future. If this difference is not attended to, trouble results,
as Rota shows in his critique. Eventually, however, this gets sorted out,
and he arrives at the two principles,
(Q3) Where a human agent N performs an act A at a time T, the act A is free
iff immediately before T, it was in N’s power to perform A at T, and
immediately before T it was in N’s power to refrain from performing
A at T,
and
(Q3*) Where a human agent N refrains from performing an act A at a time
T, the omission ~A is free iff immediately before T, it was in N’s power
to perform A at T, and immediately before T it was in N’s power to
refrain from performing A at T.

I am happy to accept these two propositions as correctly derived from my
position.
Next, Rota introduces a difficulty concerning timing. Suppose I am
riding on a subway train, between stops. It was not in my power “immediately before” the present instant to refrain from riding on the train;
there’s no way off the train between stops. This would lead, given (Q3),
to the erroneous conclusion that my riding is not free, when in fact it is.
Now, my own tendency would be to address this by relaxing slightly the
“immediately before” requirement, and saying that my riding is free if a
few minutes ago, when I was about to board the train, it was in my power
not to do so. Rota, however, has a different solution. Following Suarez
and some other medievals, he introduces a distinction between the “commanded action”—an ordinary action such as riding on a subway train,
which takes time to be completed—and the “act of will,” the act in which
the will instantaneously “commands” or instigates the ordinary action in
question. (In his example the act of will does this by controlling the state
of the electron e.) It will then be the act of will that is free in the primary
sense; the commanded action is free in a derivative sense, because it results from a free act of will. In view of this, he offers two principles which
tell us whether an act of will is free:
(Q4) Where a human agent N performs an act of will α at a time T, the act is
free iff immediately before T, it was in N’s power to perform α at T, and
immediately before T it was in N’s power to refrain from performing α
at T,

and
(Q4*) Where a human agent N refrains from performing an act of will α at a
time T, the omission ~ α is free iff immediately before T, it was in N’s
power to perform α at T, and immediately before T it was in N’s power
to refrain from performing α at T.

The distinction between acts of will and commanded acts is a useful one, if
it is carefully employed. And while I doubt that anything done by human
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beings is truly instantaneous, I will go along for now with the assumption
that this is true of acts of will. One point to notice, for future reference, is
that acts of will are by definition causally efficacious; the act of will controls the “state of the agent’s will,” represented here by the state of the
electron e. Given this, I can tentatively accept (Q4) and (Q4*) as formulating
my view.
Now, however, Rota introduces his counterexample. Suppose I am considering whether or not to perform some act of will α—say, the act that
would initiate my getting onto the subway car. At a certain instant before
I have made my decision, God (who has made up his own mind only at
that instant2), intervenes and puts my brain in the state that will lead to
my not getting on the subway. According to Rota, the definiens for (Q4*) is
satisfied, and (Q4*) implies that my failure to perform α is free. But clearly,
it is not free, so (Q4*) is falsified.
This is too quick. (Q4*) applies only when an agent refrains from performing an act of will, so we need to consider what is involved in “refraining.” In order to be free with respect to performing α, there must
be alternatives that are within the agent’s power. Notice, however, that
for the most part (and possibly always3) these alternatives will consist of
other acts of will that might be performed instead, rather than the alternative of performing no act of will at all. (Instead of performing the act of
will that would initiate my getting on the subway, I may perform the act
that would initiate my leaving the platform, or the act that would initiate
my staying right where I am, waiting for the next train.4) But in Rota’s
example there is no act of will that I perform at T; God, by intervening, has
assumed control of the state of my will, and whatever may be going on in
my mind, it is not a causally efficacious “act of will” such as would be required if I were to refrain from performing α at T. So I do not refrain from
performing α; rather I am prevented by God from doing this. (Q4*) does not
apply, and the principle emerges unscathed.
It might occur to us that the problem here is merely linguistic, arising
from the implications of the word “refrains.” Perhaps, then, we can save
the counterexample by formulating a principle which avoids that word,
for instance:
(Q4!) Where a human agent N does not perform an act of will α at a
time T, the non-performance of α is free iff immediately before T,
it was in N’s power to perform α at T, and immediately before T it
was in N’s power to refrain from performing α at T.
2
This is necessary, since if God had all along a settled intention to intervene, this would
preclude my performing an “act of will” in the situation and would negate my freedom.
3
The possible exception is a state of “quiescence of will,” in which the agent abstains
from willing anything at all for a period of time. This may be the goal in some meditation
disciplines, for instance that of Zen Buddhism. We would then have the paradoxical situation of a state of “willed non-willing.” I will not pursue this possibility further here.
4
Note Rota’s statement, in his Reply, that “When N performs an act of will, N’s will takes
on (or remains in) a certain state” (emphasis added).
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(Q4!), I admit, does not escape from Rota’s counterexample. But (Q4!) is
false in any case, so there is no need for me to defend it. The problem with
(Q4!) is that the relevant notion of freedom applies only in cases involving
at least some degree of intention on the part of the agent, but no such intention is required by (Q4!). To see this, think of some situation in which you
can see, in retrospect, that there was something you might have done in
that situation, something that might have had a desirable result of some
sort. At the time, however, it “never entered your mind” that you might
act in that way; it simply wasn’t something you in any way considered. It
would, I submit, be entirely inappropriate to describe your not performing that action as “free” or “voluntary.” And because of this, the hope of
saving the counterexample by supplying an innocuous replacement for
“refrains” is doomed to failure. If the replacement term implies an intentional act (or an intentional “non-act”) on the part of the agent that results
in a particular brain-state, the principle will not apply to Rota’s example;
if it does not, the principle will be false anyway and need not be defended.
I conclude that Rota’s attempt to craft a counterexample to my account of
free action is unsuccessful.
The remaining disagreement between us concerns the “diachronic vs.
synchronic” accounts of contingency and of powers. Here the issue concerns the “act of will” by which N instantaneously causes his will to be in
the relevant state for bringing about some “commanded act.” Prior to time
T (assumed to be a point-instant), N has both the power to perform the act
of will in question and the power to refrain from performing it. After T,
however, N no longer has the power to refrain from performing the act,
since he has already performed it. Now, the question Rota is raising is,
does N have this power at T, or does he not? And this is indeed a question to which we give different answers. Rota, on the basis of my previous
statements, assumes I will reject
(7) For some human agent N, some act A, and some time T, N performs A
at T, and N is free at T with respect to performing A,

and will affirm
(11) For any human agent N who performs an act A at some time T, N is not
free at T with respect to doing A at T.

It should be noted, however, that in my previous discussion of (7) and (11)
the act A was assumed to be, in our present terminology, a “commanded
act,” an ordinary action which takes time to complete. However, we are
now speaking of “acts of will,” which are instantaneous. And when the
question concerns acts of will, my answer is that the question as Rota
frames it has no answer; it is an improper question. Consider a parallel example. There is on some piece of land a concrete wall, made up of
straight segments. At C there is a corner, at which the wall changes direction. You ask me, “What is the direction of the wall at C?” I answer,
“Before C the wall is going east northeast, but after C it is going straight

Faith and Philosophy

470

east.” You, however, are not satisfied: you ask, impatiently, “Yes, but what
is the direction of the wall at C?” And now I must reply that your question
has no answer. The “direction of a wall at a point” means, and can only
mean, the direction of a segment of the wall that includes that point. If the
direction changes discontinuously at the point in question, the only possible answer is to give the (different) directions taken by the wall on each
side of the point. If that is not what is wanted, then no answer is possible.
And now for Rota’s question about N’s power at T, with respect to refraining from the act of will α, the act which he performs at T. My answer
is that up until T he has the power to refrain, and thereafter he lacks that
power. If you aren’t satisfied by that, no further answer is possible, any
more than it is possible to specify the direction of the wall at C. The expression, ‘the power N has at T’ simply does not refer to anything. That is
all there is to it.
Rota, however, has a different answer. According to him (following Suarez, etc.), N both has the power at T to refrain, and also lacks that power.
That is, he has the power at the earlier “instant of nature” at which he has
not yet made his decision, and he lacks the power at that later instant of
nature at which he has already made the decision, both instants of nature
being temporally simultaneous with T.
Now, I am not in general averse to distinguishing between the order
of explanation and the temporal order; I believe that we do sometimes
have to make this distinction. I am not, however, convinced of the usefulness of the distinction in this particular case. My account is considerably
simpler than Rota’s, so it would seem to be incumbent on him to justify
adding what may seem to be unnecessary complications. Furthermore,
his account entails the apparently contradictory claim that, at T, the agent
both has the power and lacks the power to refrain from the act of will in
question (viz., the act performed at T). Rota’s solution to this is that “Statements of the form ‘N has at T the power to perform α at T’ and ‘N has at
T the power to refrain from performing α at T’, and their negations, are
incomplete, and need to be indexed to instants of nature.”5 In view of this,
we have, for instance,
(X) For some human agent N, some act of will α, and some time T, N
performs α at T, and it is N’s power at T in the earlier instant of
nature to refrain from performing α,
and
(Y) For any human agent N who performs an act of will α at some time
T, it is not in N’s power at T in the later instant of nature to refrain
from performing α.
These two propositions are not formally inconsistent. It is not clear, however, that we have made any progress with the underlying problem: How
5

In an e-mail.
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can a single substance, N, be in both of two contradictory states simultaneously—that is, in the same instant of time? We may ask, furthermore,
where are the truth-makers for (X) and (Y), that account for the difference between them? Since acts of will are wholly interior to the agent, one
might think that the truth-makers for such statements must be found in
some state of the agent. But there is absolutely no difference in the state of
the agent N in the two instants of nature; both instants of nature are contained in the single, indivisible point-instant T. Nor does N have “parts”
such that (X) could be true of one part and (Y) true of another part. And
no other solution to the truth-maker problem seems to be available. These
truths, we must conclude, do not “supervene upon being.”
Finally, a brief comment about proof, and the burden of proof. Rota
describes me as offering a “proof” of theological incompatibilism, and he
considers that he has dealt my attempt a heavy blow by arguing that one or
more of my premises are “dubious.” I have attempted to rebut his specific
arguments against those premises. But insofar as a proof is an argument
which should compel the assent of any reasonable and well-informed person, I make no claim to have “proved” theological incompatibilism. Like
many other philosophers, I have reluctantly concluded that proof in this
sense is rarely if ever available for significant philosophical positions. I
am content if I have presented an argument which seems to me to be
clearly correct, and whose premises are at least as plausible (I would hope,
more plausible) than the premises of arguments for opposing views. With
regard to the opposition between diachronic and synchronic accounts of
powers, I believe my diachronic account is superior to Rota’s synchronic
account in several ways. It is clearly simpler, and also more readily comprehensible. (Consider the propositions (X) and (Y), which are essential
for his view.) Furthermore, it is superior with regard to coherence, both
internal and external. Internally, it is far from clear that the conjunction
of (X) and (Y) is consistent. As for external coherence, his view conflicts
with the widely accepted principle that “truth supervenes upon being,”
whereas mine does not. On the other hand, his synchronic view may
make it easier to defend theological doctrines which are dearly cherished
by some thinkers. So full agreement is unlikely, but I do want to express
my appreciation to Rota for his illuminating and very helpful discussion.
Huntington University

